An Analysis
By Omar Zahran
Jul/Aug 25
On April 23 the Jordanian Interior Minister Mazen Al-Faraya announced a comprehensive ban on the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen), declaring it an “illegal organization” effective immediately. The move was described as a “clean break” and a “final divorce” from Jordan’s past policy of containment.
The ban covers all Brotherhood-related activities in the country, including the promotion of its ideology. Authorities closed all Brotherhood offices – even those shared with other groups – and expedited the confiscation of its assets. Jordanian police also raided the headquarters of the Brotherhood’s political arm, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), seizing documents and computers. News media outlets were prohibited from publishing any Brotherhood-affiliated content after the raids. Social media sites were also monitored by Jordanian authorities.
This sweeping crackdown signals a deliberate effort to eliminate the Brotherhood’s operational capacity in Jordan surpassing previous legal restrictions. Analysts note that the ban treats the Brotherhood not just as an illegal entity but as an existential threat, making a return to the status quo ante unlikely.
The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt by Islamic scholar and schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna in 1928, was officially registered in Jordan in 1945. It operated legally for decades, building broad public support especially in urban centers. Historically, it pursued peaceful, institutional means to achieve its goals, even participating in local and national elections. The Brotherhood’s claim of legality stems from the fact that King Abdullah I – the present king’s great-grandfather – performed the opening ceremony of the Brotherhood’s first headquarters in Jordan. Since then, many of Jordan’s political elite were either members or supporters of al-Ikhwan.
Jordan’s regional policy toward the Brotherhood was unique, balancing tolerance with containment. But tensions escalated after the Brotherhood opposed the July 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty negotiated between then U.S. President Bill Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin, and Jordanian King Hussein. Conflict between the Brotherhood and the Jordanian state further escalated during the Arab Spring.
Despite a 2020 court order dissolving the Brotherhood, the group continued operating with tacit state tolerance. The IAF remained Jordan’s largest opposition party winning 31 out of 138 seats in the 2024 elections and effectively tripling its representation in the House of Representatives amid public anger over the ongoing Israeli genocide in Gaza.
Still, the all-out ban reflects the failure of Jordan’s containment strategy. Past measures, like licensing the Muslim Brotherhood Society in 2015 (an Ikhwan splinter faction), did not curb the Brotherhood’s influence. The 2024 electoral success of the IAF, fueled by pro-Palestine sentiment amongst the Jordanian public, likely prompted the state to tighten control as it has come to view the Brotherhood’s growing influence as a threat to state sovereignty.
The ban follows accusations of a foiled April 2025 plot involving Brotherhood members who were accused of manufacturing short-range missiles, smuggling weapons, recruiting militants, and planning attacks on security forces at sensitive sites.
Authorities linked the suspects to “unlicensed groups” and released alleged confessions tying them to the Brotherhood. The Interior Ministry accused the group of operating covertly to destabilize the Jordanian government.
Reports suggested that the accused had outside ties including alleged Iranian weapon transfers via Syria. For its part, the Brotherhood vehemently denied involvement, though these denials allow that some members may have acted independently. Leaked documents claimed to be signed confessions state that the ultimate destination of these weapons was the Palestinian West Bank and that they were not meant for use in Jordan. On April 30, Jordan’s State Security Court sentenced four of the accused men to 20 years in prison for “transporting and storing explosives and automatic weapons,” according to The Jordan Times.
The government framed the plot as crossing a “red line” justifying the shift from containment to suppression.
The Cradle, however, noted, “While the crackdown can be viewed as an internal security measure, its timing and broader political implications suggest that it was also influenced by external pressures, notably from the U.S.
Reactions were varied. The IAF distanced itself by freezing out members linked to the alleged plot. The public was split between supporters of national security and critics accusing the government of scapegoating. Across the region, Gulf states tacitly endorsed the ban; Hamas and Brotherhood factions throughout the Middle East condemned it. On the international front, some Western allies balanced security concerns with unease over civil liberties.
In the immediate future, the IAF faces an existential crisis. Some believe the Jordanian government will continue to grant latitude for its operations. Others suggest that the state will send the message that reform is mandated if the IAF wants to continue to operate within the confines of the Jordanian political system. However, not allowing the IAF’s unfettered operation within the political system may risk the radicalization of Jordan’s youth, further internal unrest, and strained regional ties. A beneficial result of this policy though could include Jordan’s alignment with anti-Brotherhood states.
The banning of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan marks a historic shift ending that state’s unique policy of Brotherhood engagement. The long-term impacts of this shift hinge upon whether the move stabilizes Jordan or fuels further instability. Regionally, there are strong hopes in Jordan’s ability to weather this storm as it has done historically.
Omar Zahran is a freelance writer.
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