The Pakistani Army – The New East India Company or a Trojan Horse?

_{Kakul to Castles}

By Sher A. Farouki

Jan/Feb 25

Pakistan’s formidable army, known for its discipline and resilience, can be divided into two groups – second lieutenant to colonel (group 1) and brigadier to general (group 2) – that operate as separate entities within the military hierarchy, with distinct roles and experiences that shape their perspectives and duties.

To comprehend the army’s rank and structure, one must delve into its officers and soldiers’ characteristics and lives. Unfortunately, many within the army and the public are unaware of the stark contrast primarily because the Pakistani Army effectively shields its inner workings from public scrutiny. This practice also  ensures that officers up to the rank of colonel remain largely unaware of broader realities.

Within the army, there is a prevalent belief that commanders must be strict, vigilant, and controlling. From the outset, officers are trained to keep their subordinates continuously occupied with ambitious plans and activities so that the army’s strict criteria won’t be challenged. This relentless approach ensures that troops  formations and exercises are engaged year-round without respite.

In Group 1, the officers and soldiers spend their careers moving from one challenging post to another, often in harsh and isolated environments. The army relies heavily on instilling a sense of extreme religious and national motivation to keep them going.

Such realities take a significant toll on the officers’ mental health. Many come from humble backgrounds and have faced severe deprivation. The iron discipline enforced by the military leaves little room for personal reflection or dissent. The perpetual uncertainty and fear of ostracization weigh heavily upon them. An infantry officer is considered fortunate if he spends even six years out of a 26-year career in a peaceful posting within a major city. These conditions’ cumulative effects often leads to mental strain, making officers eccentric, mentally impaired, and/or highly sensitive to either internal or external scrutiny.

The Unseen Struggles and Transformation of Armed Forces Personnel

Life for all armed forces personnel is tough. They face physical, administrative, mental, and financial challenges. This strain is particularly pronounced for married officers ranging from captain to colonel, who often struggle to make ends meet. Unlike many professions, the Pakistani military offers no opportunities for personal financial gain. It remains a strictly professional field, like many other military organizations worldwide. However, noteworthy that high ranking officers in the U.S. can become millionaires if not at least hundred thousand-aires. 

From the outset of their training at institutions like the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) at Kakul, the cadets are groomed to uphold honesty, ethics, and loyalty to their nation and profession. These values become their hallmark However, a significant shift occurs at the major general rank, when an officer’s status transforms into something almost untouchable. From that point forward he is often referred to as a “holy cow,” beyond the usual bounds of accountability. Around 2% of a given cohort  achieve this rank. 

This elevation comes with profound changes – newfound authority, a presumed infallibility, and the constant presence of sycophants can foster a detrimental “above the law” mentality. For many, this marks the beginning of a troubling transformation. Once paragons of integrity and professionalism, they may start flexing their newfound power, morphing into a figure akin to a hungry crocodile always looking for opportunities to assert dominance and accrue personal gain and wealth.

This transformation underscores the critical need for sustained accountability and ethical vigilance, regardless of rank, in the military hierarchy. While most officers retain their integrity, the few who succumb can tarnish the entire institution’s reputation. Ensuring that honesty, ethics, and discipline are upheld at all levels is crucial for maintaining the armed forces’ honor and respect.

Business Empire – The Genesis

In the pre-Partition era, the British Indian Army allotted agricultural land ranging from 100 to over 1,000 acres to its regiments, contingent upon the regiment’s operational performance and its reputation). This land was intended to generate revenue for the troops’ welfare, ensuring a good standard of living in the barracks and during wartime.

Following WW II and before Partition, the army established a welfare fund to support troops who were wounded, or troops’ families if they were killed in action. Upon independence in 1947, this fund was divided based on the proportion of the British Indian army troops allocated to each country created by partition. Pakistan’s share was approximately 18% of the total.

The Pakistani Army utilized its share to establish projects aimed at supporting soldiers and their families. Among the initiatives was the Fauji Foundation and smaller projects.  is a charitable trust founded in 1954 to provide employment opportunities to Pakistani ex-military personnel and to generate funds for the welfare of widows, and families of martyrs. Today, it runs more than 18 industries, the income from which is utilized to serve about 9 million beneficiaries (5 % of country’s population).

These ventures have grown into a vast business empire generating billions of rupees in profit, a significant portion of which constitutes a private reserve fund at the COAS’s (chief of army staff)  disposal. He has unfettered discretion over its use. 

General Musharraf – The Start of Organizational Corruption

During Gen. Pervez Musharraf’s tenure (both as COAS and president, 2001-08), this fund was notably misappropriated and manipulated for the top military brass’ benefit. Adjusted to favor senior and high-ranking officers and ensure their loyalty to COAS via bribery, their financial status became significantly enhanced. A major general, typically a grade 21 officer, the second highest rank in government employment, could amass assets worth more than $3,600,000  while a 3-star lieutenant general, a grade 22 officer, could acquire assets worth approximately $18 million, all within legal frameworks. All services operate within a hierarchical structure, with officials categorized into different grades, typically delineated by a basic pay structure.

The COAS could accumulate assets valued between $362 to $542 million, excluding any corrupt practices. Furthermore, lieutenant generals serving as corps commanders often held the position of president of the Defense Housing Authority (DHA) within their domains. The DHA, particularly in Lahore, Karachi, and Islamabad, can acquire substantial wealth accumulation through multistoried residential and commercial complexes, luxury hotels, sports complexes, educational institutions, rental billboards, and extensive shopping and food hubs. The potential for financial gain is enormous, allowing corps commanders, with the COAS’s endorsement, to accumulate substantial wealth within short tenures, often within a span of six months.

Originally, the DHA was intended to provide military officers with housing benefits, helping them cover various personal expenses. The number of lots in DHA developments was initially based on the number of cadets graduating from the military academy, ensuring that each graduate could potentially receive a lot.

Under Musharraf, these ethical guidelines and allocation criteria were abandoned. Subsequent army chiefs, notably Ashfaq Parvez Kayani (2007-13) and especially Qamar Javed Bajwa (2016-22) took advantage of these relaxed policies, further expanding DHAs regardless to the number of serving officers New rules stipulated that each new phase of DHA development must include an 1,100 sq. ft. residential lot for lieutenant generals and a 2,200 sq. ft. lot for the COAS. Senior officers were also allotted commercial lots. Reports suggest that under these rules, Bajwa acquired as many as 104 lots.

In the most lucrative DHA developments such as those in Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad, the most expensive lots are reserved for the COAS, which are kept available and allotted to the new chief as part of their service benefits. The question arises: How can the same piece of land be allotted to multiple chiefs successively? The answer lies in a specific practice. For example, in Lahore, a 2,200 sq. ft. lot behind the city’s much sought after The Mall of Lahore (officially the Shahrah Qaid-e Azam)  near the famous Rahat Bakery remains officially classified as residential, despite the vicinity’s commercial development decades ago. This land, valued at more than $100,000 per 1,100 sq. ft., amounts to over $4.3 million for the 2,200  sq. ft. lot. This sum was  allotted to the COAS and a month later, the DHA in Lahore bought it back for another $4.3 million, ensuring the Chief receives the money while the land remains available for future allotments. Since Bajwa had two tenures, he was allotted this land twice.

The British allotted agricultural land to reward officers and troops who performed great feats of valor for them against their own people. However, in some countries, allotment of such land might be part of the welfare package to war veterans, soldiers, and officers performing exceptionally well in military operations. These allotments are made based on both field and peacetime performance. The criteria for receiving such awards are stringent, with a board deciding based on points calculated from field, peacetime, and operational performances.

However, the less significant officers and soldiers are mostly given arid and poorly irrigated lands in far-flung areas, especially in southern Punjab. This system is also manipulated at the highest ranks. Upon promotion, a major general automatically reaches the required points to receive at least 50 acres of agricultural land, with lieutenant generals and full generals entitled to 100 acres.

At the higher ranks, this system is often manipulated to provide valuable estates. Outstanding officers up to the rank of brigadier are given land in deserts where cultivation is impossible, while general officers, especially those in key positions like corps commanders and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Chief of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),  receive land in urban areas like in Lahore. This land, officially termed “agricultural,” is worth a fortune due to its location within expanding housing localities. For example, land valued at $18,000 per 1,100  sq. ft. can translate to  $7.2 million for a major general and $14.4 million for a full general.

The army sells back this land to the source, paying the incumbent the equivalent market value, and ensuring future officers’ benefit from this system. If a COAS receives an extension, he can claim these benefits twice, potentially amassing assets beyond  $180 million all legally and in accordance with existing regulations. Importantly, none of this money comes from the national exchequer as it is all internally managed within the army, ensuring clerical transparency.

Selected general officers, such as those on key appointments in the General Head Quarters – Pakistan’s equivalent to the Pentagon – are also entitled to 1,100  sq. ft. residential lots and one commercial lot in any new DHA development throughout the country. This ensures that a general in a two-to-three-year tenure can accumulate significant assets. For a COAS, this legal package could easily reach  $108 million for a regular three-year tenure.

The Spring 2022 Dubai Leaks published in May 15, 2024, showed 17,000 Pakistanis are listed owners of real estate worth well above $12.5 billion. Unsurprisingly, more than a few of the listed owners are retired military officers and their families, some of whom have passed away.

The Living Conditions of the Field Army

In contrast, the field army up to battalion or brigade level is kept in deprived conditions. Their professional training and commitments ensure that they have little time for personal matters. Young officers, especially married ones, often live in poor conditions without proper accommodation. They receive inadequate allowances, making it difficult to meet basic needs. For instance, a major receives only $80 a month for his housing allowance, an amount which is insufficient for renting even one room. This leads to depression and hopelessness. Bachelor officers face even worse conditions, with minimal and often dilapidated accommodation provided.

Lions For Lambs

One must distinguish between the field army and the upper echelon of generals. Unlike civilian promotions, the path to becoming a general is highly competitive and unpredictable. Success requires not only hard work but also manipulation, deception, and self-promotion.

Very few officers achieve the prestigious rank of major general or higher. Out of a cohort of 600 officer cadets, only three to six typically reach this level. However, hard work and dedication alone are insufficient. To move beyond the rank of brigadier, one also needs to employ deceit, cheating, sycophancy, and manipulation, not to mention using others to climb the ranks, subtle tactics and skullduggery, and pleasing superiors through flattery and deception .

Thus, major generals are skilled manipulators, deceivers, and flatterers. Masters in the art of lying and pleasing their superiors, they join a group that values money above all else. This group disregards ethics and boundaries in the pursuit of accumulating wealth and privileges.

Having lost touch with their comrades and brothers-in-arms, they use military jargon only rhetorically and have little regard for other soldiers, officers, or the field army. Their primary concern is acquiring wealth, including overseas properties, luxurious mansions, and businesses. They have no genuine regard for their country or its people, speaking of patriotism only for appearances. These hypocrites have no sense of belonging and use their position to deceive their subordinates.

The generals, a disconnected group posing only for optics, are pretentious, hypocritical, and more concerned with personal gain than with institutional and national welfare. They exploit the young officers’ sacrifices, often as young as 18 or 20, who lay down their lives in encounters. ISI and the ISPR (Inter-Services Public Relations) play politics with  these young officers’ lives, using their widows and children for media appearances to manipulate public sentiment. These emotional dramas blind the field army and the masses, creating a façade of patriotism and sacrifice.

The role of ISPR has significantly developed. ISPR chief Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif now has increased structural and logistical support, including two major generals working under him. This strategic move of Pakistani military aims to fully control the story.

These generals understand the poor peoples’ psyche and manipulate their emotions by showcasing the deaths of young officers killed in the line of duty. Meanwhile, they focus on formulating rules to benefit themselves, eyeing the army’s vast private funds. Young officers, on the other hand, face inadequate facilities, insufficient salaries, and other challenges that make it difficult to support their families.

The generals cleverly exploit these young officers’ motivations in the name of nationalism and patriotism. The 2007 Hollywood movie Lions for Lambs aptly depicts the army’s situation. This group of generals remains beyond accountability. Even after retirement, a lieutenant general enjoys the services of several army paid servants and chauffeurs. When a general dies, these services are transferred to his wife until her death.

The COAS bears a resemblance to the ancient sultans who ascended thrones by vanquishing all their contemporary rivals. This ascent, however, as explained above, is far from easy. Once at the apex, the COAS becomes the supreme authority over all matters. Armed with immense power and infkuence, he can eliminate any entity that might challenge his autocratic decrees, which are issued solely based on his personal whims and desires. Thus, he becomes a figure akin to a demigod with no obligation to heed dissent. Existing above the law and beyond religious, social, and moral constraints, he effectively becomes the embodiment of the law and authority.

One must distinguish between the military as a whole and certain generals’ immorality. The former is a vast and diverse institution, comprising hundreds of thousands of individuals who have dedicated their lives to serving their country. They perform a wide range of duties, from defending the borders and maintaining peace to providing humanitarian aid and disaster relief. Most of these service members are apolitical, focusing solely on their duty to protect and serve their nation.

However, a small subset of the military leadership – namely, some generals – may become entangled in political affairs or engage in unethical behavior. These actions are examples of their personal failings.  Conflating the military with the actions of a few can lead to widespread misunderstanding and undeserved criticism.

When “military” is loosely used for criticism, it unjustly tarnishes the 99% who are uninvolved in politics and serve with honor and integrity. This broadbrush approach not only disrespects them, facilitating the generals to deflect criticism and hide behind the military’s good. Such an approach effectively addresses the issues, and the public remains informed about the misconduct of this group without unfairly implicating the entire military. 

Sher A. Faroukii is a freelance writer.